Russia Wars and Battles

                                                         Russian

                                                                                                     

                                                  Wars and Battles 

            In World War II the Russian men and women were first-rate fighters from the start, but not well trained. They became first-rate soldiers with experience. They fought tough, had amazing endurance, and could carry on without most of the things other armies regarded as necessities, The Russian Staff were quick to learn from their early defeats, and soon became highly efficient.The tank forces were formidable. The Russian guerrillas were active behind the German front continually and by 1944 had forced the Germans too often abandon the use of all but a few truck roads as supply routes and German troops were cut off captured In World War II or killed. the best Russian Victory was the offensive from the Vistula in January, 1945.

          The German policy of clinging on at all cost in particular palaces repeatedly changed their

campaign for the worse. The attempt to cement one threatened breach in the front line repeatedly

caused fresh breaches somewhere else, in the end that proved fatal.  The Russian heavy tanks were a

surprise in quality and reliability from the outset, but the Russians proved to have less artillery than had been expected, and their air force did not offer serious opposition at first. General Kleist said, 

        “The Russian equipment was very good even in 1941, especially the tanks. The artillery was

excellent. Most of the infantry weapons---their rifles were more modern than ours, and had

a more rapid rate of fire. Their T.34 tank was the finest in the world. The Russians maintained their

advantage in tank design and that in the “Stalin” tank, which appeared in 1944 the best, tank that

was seen in battle, anywhere, up to the end of the war.”

      British experts have criticize the Russian tanks for lacking the refinements, and gadgets, desirable in various operations especially for wireless control. But the German tank experts concede that the British and Americans tended to sacrifice too much in the way of power and performance for these

refinements. On the equipment side the Russians’ weakest period had been in 1942. They had not been able to make up for their 1941 losses, and throughout the year were short particularly in artillery. They had to use mortars brought up on lorries to compensate their lack of artillery. But from 1943 on their equipment position became better and better. While the inpouring flow of Allied supplies was a big factor, especially in motor transport, the increasing production of the new Russian factories in the East, out of reach, accounted for even more. The tanks employed were almost entirely of Russian manufacture. 

       A surprising feature of the campaign I in the East was that the Russians did not make any

effective use of airborne forces, although they had led the world in the development of air forces which played a prominent part in Army Manoeuvers in pre-war years. Russia never used their parachute troops. Maybe their training was insufficient-due to lack of practice in navigation as well as in dropping. They did drop agents and small parties for sabotage behind the German front.

      The leadership was poor in 1941. Budenny a Russian officer for instance was said to have had a very large moustache, and a very small brain. But in following years there is no doubt of improvement in the generalship. Zhukov was very good. Interestingly he first studied strategy in Germany under General von Seeckt in 1921-23, and  General Koniev was a clever tactician. As

the war dragged on, the Russian developed an increasingly high standard of leadership from top to

bottom. One of the greatest assets was their officers’ readiness to learn and the way they studied their

job. Russia could afford to make mistakes, because of their immense superiority of strength.

The top rungs were filled by men who had proved themselves so able that they were allowed

to exercise their own judgment, and could safely inset on doing things in their own way. The bottom

rungs were filled by junior officers who, within their limited sphere, tended to develop a good tactical

sense, because the incompetent soon became casualties in a field that was ruled by the hard realities of the Germans bullets and shells. The intermediate commanders, more that most armies, were

concerned with other factors. Their superiors order and judgments were more to be feared than the

enemy. It was usually safe to encourage the Russian to attack, so long as the defense was elastic.

The Germans noticed the Russians were always very bull-headed in their offensive methods,

repeating their attacks again and again. This was due to the leaders living in fear of being considered

lacking in determination if they broke of their attack.

     As regards the general characteristics of the Russian soldier, what might be called the soulless

indifference of the troops, is something more than fatalism. They were not sensitive when thing went

badly. It was difficult to make any impression on them the way that would happen with troops of other nations. On the Finnish front, for example, there was only one instance where Russian troops

surrendered. All that extraordinary stolidity made the Russians very difficult to conquer.

To be continued…The Ukraine 

  

 DR. KARL WALLACE D.D.S.

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